CASE NO. C07-02440-EDL

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Defendant Dataway hereby opposes Plaintiff AT&T's dispositive motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. § 56 and Local Rule 56-1. As the record evidence does not support each element of Plaintiff's complaint but is sufficient to establish each element of Counterplaintiff Dataway's Countercomplaint, this Court should deny Plaintiff AT&T's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Mot. SJ") and only enter summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. § 56(a) in favor of Counterplaintiff Dataway.

I. INTRODUCTION

This litigation began as a collection action in which Plaintiff AT&T alleges that Dataway is responsible for certain charges for telephone calls made to the Philippines using AT&T services and further alleges Dataway has refused to pay said charges. Dataway denies that it incurred said charges but that the alleged charges were the result of the unauthorized, intervening criminal conduct of third-party hackers from a remote location and not made using the services contracted for by Dataway, but charged to an account neither opened, maintained, nor authorized by Dataway. Defendant asserts, moreover, that Plaintiff promised to set up protections against both "slamming" (switching telecommunications services without direct instructions from the customer) and also against fraudulent access by third parties, and that it failed to do so, resulting in the charges which it now seeks to recover from Defendant. Therefore, Dataway has counterclaimed against Plaintiff alleging various contract breaches, fraud and violation of the "anti-slamming" law, 47 U.S.C. § 258.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Motion for Summary Adjudication pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. § 56(a) shall be entered if there is no issue for trial, if no rational, reasonable jury would return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Fed. R. Civ. P. § 56(c) states that that the pleadings, dispositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits have to show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Supporting and opposing affidavits "...shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. § 56(e). Based on the specific facts on record and the undisputed, background, and contextual facts, this Court should not grant Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment in AT&T's favor upon its Complaint for Damages but enter summary judgment in Dataway's favor upon its Counterclaims.

II. ALLEGEDLY UNDISPUTED AND IN FACT UNDISPUTED FACTS

On page 1-3 of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, AT&T states facts and wrongfully alleges that these facts are undisputed.

A. Actual Undisputed Facts

AT&T fails to mention that (1) there are undisputed facts that support Dataway's assertions and (2) AT&T's so-called undisputed facts are unsupported by the record. These are all facts and allegations stated in Dataway's Answer and in its Counterclaims. AT&T never responded to these pleadings. A failure to respond to a pleading to which a response is required results in an admission of the averment to which no response is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(C) a party "...must serve a reply to an answer within 20 days after being served with an order to reply, unless the order specifies a different time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(C). The responsive pleading to a counterclaim is a reply. A reply to a counterclaim must be designated as such (Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)) and must be served 20 days after service of the answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). None of these responsive pleadings were filed and/or served by AT&T. Instead, AT&T only filed a motion to dismiss. This motion merely extends Plaintiff's time to answer but does not constitute a responsive pleading. Hence, all facts and allegations in Dataway's Answer and Counterclaim are admitted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6).

B. Most Facts asserted by AT&T in its Motion for Summary Judgment p. 1 l.5 – p. 3 l. 15 are in fact disputed, not proven by evidence on the record, and/or proved contrary by the record

On pages 1-3 of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, AT&T states "facts" and in almost each allegation wrongfully represents that these "facts" are undisputed.

1. Dataway does not dispute Facts No. 1, 2 and 17

Defendant merely agrees that the following is undisputed, that (1) Plaintiff AT&T is a New York corporation, doing business in the State of California (¶ 1 of Defendant's Answer

that was admitted by AT&T as explained supra (hereinafter "Adm. Answ.")), (2) that
Defendant Dataway is a California corporation with its principal place of business in San
Francisco, California (¶ 2 of the Adm. Answ.), and (3) that AT&T made demand for charges
amounting to \$11,534.67 and a billing dispute ensued (see Mot. SJ. p.2 1.26-27). Hence, only
the facts that Plaintiff numbered # 1, 2 and 17 are undisputed.

2. AT&T's so-called "undisputed facts" are either still in controversy or run contrary to the contract

All other purported facts allegedly supporting AT&T's asserted claims are in dispute and were not proven by any evidence that was properly produced. Unlike alleged in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant challenged Plaintiff's facts # 3 and 4, the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of this Court and Venue. See ¶¶ 5 and 6 of the Adm. Answ.

The "facts" # 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, are solely supported by the affidavit of Mr. Lakes which is insufficient for three reasons. First, Mr. James Lake is a person so far not involved in the dispute and unknown to Defendant. This is particularly remarkable as Plaintiff had several chances to produce Mr. Lakes but failed to do so. In particular, Dataway requested to conduct a deposition of the most knowledgeable officer, director, managing agent, employee and/or agent of the Fraud Resolution Group (Investigative Management), responsible for AT&T customers in the San Francisco area, who worked for AT&T and/or can testify on events or surrounding circumstances relating to fraud resolution and shortfall investigation between May 2006 and May 2007, and who are most qualified to testify on its behalf regarding the appropriate areas of examination. See Notice of Deposition, Exhibit A. Mr. Lake appears to be the actual person most knowledgeable on the foregoing matters but AT&T failed to disclose or produce Mr. Lake throughout the proper discovery period effectively running contrary to the courts discovery rules and orders. Hence, Mr. Lake's statements should be disregarded because Defendant did not have a chance to cross-examine Mr. Lakes. Producing Mr. Lakes at this late stage of the proceeding creates serious issues of material fact and denies Dataway's discovery rights.

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Second, in ¶ 5 of his declaration, Mr. Lake states that he can and does merely testify to the identity of AT&T's records and documents. See Declaration of James Lake, p. 21.15-23. These documents are out of court statements that were not made by the affiant and are now offered for evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Mr. Lake's statements are inadmissible hearsay and do not satisfy FED. R. CIV. P. § 56(e) because Mr. Lake does not base his affidavit on facts that would be permissible in evidence. His declaration cannot be used as a supporting affidavit.

Third, almost all of "facts" No. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, which are solely supported by Mr. Lake's affidavit were (1) previously disputed by Defendant, (2) no other evidence was produced that would prove AT&T's allegations and/or (3) the facts, stated in the contrary, were admitted by AT&T due to its failure to respond to Dataway's Answer and its Counterclaim (hereinafter "Adm. CC"). "Fact" No. 5: At no point was it established how the unauthorized Legacy T account was established. Neither Simon Lewis nor Francisco Molieri knew that the hacker might have used AT&T's "Casual Calling Services." See Deposition of Francisco Molieri, p. 181. 12-23, p. 591.18, Declaration of Simon Lewis, p. 111.16 – p.121.3, Adm. CC. ¶ 10. Expert discovery will be necessary to determine what method the hackers used and how they conducted the calls to the Philippines. "Fact" No.6: It is not established why Tariff 30 is relevant to the dispute at hand and Dataway argues that the tariff is not applicable because it never authorized the calls and should not be charged for them in the first place. There is no evidence on record that Tariff 30 governs Legacy S accounts and/or unauthorized Legacy T accounts. Adm. CC. ¶ 35. "Fact" No.8: Dataway alleged in all its pleadings and confirmed through discovery that the changes that were made to its telephone service were made without its authorization and that the calls were not executed by Dataway. Adm. CC. ¶¶ 8, 10, 34. On p. 2 1.4 of the Mot. SJ. AT&T even concedes that it is likely/possible that the calls were not authorized. "Fact" No. 9: Dataway asserts that the calls made on July 24, 2006 were the responsibility of AT&T because it failed to impose sufficient security means. Adm. CC. ¶¶ 32-33. "Fact" No. 10: Again, it is not in evidence how the calls to the Philippines were executed (see supra) and pursuant to the Telecommunication Act. AT&T is obliged to impose security

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means sufficient to verify the authorization of the service change (see supra). "Fact" No. 11 and

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12: Dataway did receive a bill for the unauthorized calls. However, Mr. Lake's declaration states this bill was for the provided telecommunication services to Dataway, for the calls that were "placed using [Dataway's] system through the AT&T network by dialing carrier access code 1010288." This is entirely inaccurate. AT&T admitted that the hackers compromised the voicemail system Dataway maintained with AT&T. Adm. CC. ¶¶ 8, 18, Deposition Francisco Molieri p. 8 1.2-7, Bate-Stamp DW 003. For this reason the charges were not on Dataway's long-distance corporate bill but on a summary billing account. The type of connection was not a regular call but a "nailed-up connection" that was also detected as irregular by AT&T. Deposition of Simon Lewis p. 45 l. 13-25. Hence, Dataway's system was not only allegedly compromised but both "facts" as stated by AT&T are not in evidence. "Fact" No. 13: The charges for the unauthorized calls that were admittedly executed by hackers (see supra) amounted to \$11,534.67 and were wrongfully presented to Dataway on a bill due September 25, 2006. "Fact" No. 14: Tariff F.C.C. No. 30 does state that payment is due upon presentation of an invoice. Dataway's payment upon this invoice was not due because AT&T waived its charges. Adm. CC. ¶¶ 11, 21, 23. "Fact" No. 15: AT&T admitted that hackers executed the calls to the Philippines (see supra), that the charges should be waived (see supra), and that it was AT&T's liability to avoid a switching of services by unauthorized third party conduct (see surpa). For these reasons, Dataway does not owe AT&T a sum of \$11,534.67 nor any related interest.

Therefore, Plaintiff's assertion that the material "Facts" No. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 are not in controversy is wrong. The facts are either in dispute or proven to the contrary.

For the aforementioned three reasons it appears that Mr. Lakes affidavit was submitted in bad faith and this Court should sanction Plaintiff pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. § 56(g).

3. The remaining "Facts" No. 7, 16, 18, 19 and 20 are not proven as asserted by AT&T because AT&T stated them out of context or mischaracterized them

Despite AT&T's assertions, "Facts" No. 7, 16, 18, 19 and 20 are and remain disputed or were proven to the contrary by Dataway.

Plaintiff alleges in "Fact" No. 7 that "the telephone system owned and operated by Dataway was allegedly compromised by an unauthorized intervening party accessing the AT&T network by dialing carrier access code 1010288." Mot. SJ. p.1 l. 24-26. This statement is materially different from Dataway's statement in its counterclaim stating that "[o]n July 24, 2006 fraudulent calls were made through Dataway's existing voice mail system using AT&T's Legacy T network, a service Dataway never subscribed to and an account that was never authorized by the Defendant." See Adm. CC. ¶ 13. Dataway alleged that hackers unlawfully compromised the voicemail system Dataway maintained with AT&T. See ¶ 18 Adm. CC.; Bate-Stamp AT&T 167, Deposition of Francisco Molieri p. 7 1.18-20. Therefore, "Fact" No.7 is not proven as asserted by AT&T but as alleged in Dataway's Counterclaim.

Further, AT&T asserts that there is no evidence that AT&T waived its claim involving the charges amounting to \$11,534.67. See Mot. SJ. p.2 1.21-22. In fact, AT&T admitted that "the parties conferred, and AT&T assured Dataway that AT&T would waive the charges for the fraudulent calls once Dataway disputed them, because this pattern of illegal usage recently had occurred frequently." See Adm. CC. p.15 1.20-22. Hence, there is evidence on record that negates AT&T's allegation while supporting Dataway's allegation.

"Fact" No. 18, stating that the Telephone service was never terminated, is a fact mischaracterized and taken out of context. Proper context demonstrates that on November 3, 2006, and even after commencement of the present litigation, on April 3, 2008, AT&T sent Notices of Disconnect (see infra p. 10 l. 25 – p. 11 l.2 and p.18 l.19-22) and immediately threatened to disconnect services to Dataway. Only Dataway's actions, its communication with AT&T California and AT&T Corp., its requests to AT&T California and AT&T Corp., its informal complaints to AT&T Corp. and various telecommunication agencies, and the commencement of this suit avoided the final cut off of services.

"Facts" No. 19 and 20 as asserted by AT&T also misstate the damages suffered by Dataway. In its Counterclaim, Dataway states compensatory and non-compensatory damages according to proof at trial for each cause of action. This satisfies the notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dataway made a short and plain

statement of each claim, showing that the Counterplaintiff is entitled to relief, and made a demand for judgment for the relief the counterplaintiff seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In its Response to AT&T's Special Interrogatories, Dataway stated that damages include, but are not limited to, expenditures of time, an interruption of its business, and other expenses while attempting to resolve the dispute in an amount of \$57,200.00.

AT&T's assertion of so-called undisputed facts are, besides Facts No. 1, 2 and 17, either (1) inadmissible, (2) remain in controversy and were disputed by Dataway's or (3) were admitted in the contrary by AT&T due to its failure to respond (see supra).

IV. AT&T'CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT AND PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE UNDISPUTED FACTS SUPPORTING THE ELEMENTS OF ITS CAUSES OF ACTION

The pleadings and discovery has shown that Plaintiff's Complaint is without merit. Plaintiff's first counts, liability under 47 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq., is not actionable and therefore, its second count, Unjust Enrichment, lacks a sufficient basis for disgorgement. In any case, all or at least one of the elements of Dataway's causes of action cannot be established by facts on record. Hence, there are no genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because both counts may reasonably be resolved only in Dataway's favor.

A. 47 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. does not impose liability on a customer like Dataway and is not supported by any facts on record

Plaintiff's cause of action is without merit because 47 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. does not create a claim for a telecommunication carrier against a customer. The Communications Act, which encompasses the Telecommunications Act of 1996, contains several sections outlining rules for telecommunications companies to abide by and the course of action when such rules are broken. Section 201(b) requires common carriers to furnish service, stating that "all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful." 47 U.S.C. § 201. Pursuant to section 206 of the Communications Act a common carrier shall be liable to the person injured if the carrier does,

or permits to be done, any act, matter, or thing prohibited or declared to be unlawful it shall be liable to the person injured for the full amount of damages sustained. The highly discussed issue if the Telecommunication Act creates private rights and if a failure to compensate for dialaround calls, is a violation falling within Section 201. However, as explicitly stated in Metrophones Telecommunication, this concerns merely the carrier's claims against a common carrier [Metrophones Telecomm., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. Wash. 2005)] or a customer against a carrier. Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34826 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007). Dataway is not a telecommunication carrier that furnished unjust or unreasonable services. Dataway is a California Corporation (see Dataway's Answer, p. 21.9-10) providing managed services to clients and consulting services in the computer/network and network-security. See Deposition of Simon Lewis, p. 51. 18-20). It is merely a telecommunication customer. 47 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. however, do not provide for a cause of action of a telecommunication carrier against its customer.

As none of the elements of Plaintiff's First Cause of Action are met, this Court should enter summary judgment in favor of Dataway.

B. Quantum Meruit is not a Cause of Action in California

Plaintiff's second count is without merit. Unjust enrichment is "merely a theory of recovery." "There is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment." Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 779, 794, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347 (2003). Accordingly, as a matter of law, AT&T's unjust enrichment claim fails as a cause of action.

As Plaintiff's claim under 47 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. is without merit AT&T did not prove that it is entitled to restitution under the theory of quantum meruit. To the extent that this court should hold that AT&T proved it is entitled to restitution on any prevailing claim, it is not entitled to recover under this theory because the elements of quantum meruit are not supported by the record. Plaintiff's claim to disgorge profits is without merit because it does not satisfy the two elements of unjust enrichment: (1) Defendant must have received a benefit and (2) unjustly retained the benefit at the expense of another. At various times, AT&T agreed to Dataway's allegations that hackers accessed Dataway's voicemail system and conducted the

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calls from a remote location. Adm. CC. ¶ 8, 18, Deposition Francisco Molieri p. 8 1.2-7, Bate-Stamp DW 003. Hence, AT&T did not render any services to Dataway and Dataway did not enjoy the alleged services. In fact, Defendant was not even aware that Plaintiff performed the questioned services let alone that AT&T expected to be paid for services rendered to a third party. Moreover, any allegation to the contrary is unsupported by the record. Additionally, Plaintiff's requested damages are highly excessive. If this court should hold that a benefit has been conferred on Dataway in expectation of payment, and Dataway was thereby unjustly enriched, the measure of recovery cannot exceed the value of the benefit AT&T has conferred upon Dataway. Plaintiff did not submit any evidence that could justify why a rate of \$5.78 per minute is the value of the calls illegally carried out by unknown third person even though Dataway's contractual long distance plan rate for calls to the Philippines is \$ 0.30 cents per minute.

Therefore, the evidence is clear that and that the elements for Quantum Meruit are not satisfied either. Judgment on AT&T's second cause of action in favor of AT&T should be denied and judgment in favor of Dataway is proper.

V. <u>DATAWAY'S COUNTERCLAIMS ARE SUPPORTED</u> BY FACTS IN **EVIDENCE**

The Filed Rate Doctrine Does not Apply A.

Dataway's claims are not barred because they do not challenge the terms of a tariff. In Lovejoy AT&T also unsuccessfully claimed that "there is no fraud exception to the filed rate doctrine." Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp., 92 Cal. App. 4th 85, 102 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2001). The court acknowledged that AT&T's assertion is generally true but irrelevant unless a carrier intentionally misrepresents its rate and a customer relies on the misrepresentation. In that case the carrier cannot be held to the promised rate if it conflicts with the published tariff. The maxim that there is no "fraud" exception to the filed rate doctrine merely means that courts will not intrude into the FCC's jurisdiction by enforcing promises to charge rates or provide services which vary from the filed tariff, regardless of the promisor's intent." Id., at 102. However, "...it does not mean that all fraudulent conduct committed by a carrier is immune from remedy." Id., at 102. Dataway does not challenge the terms of a tariff. Dataway does not seek rate preferences

not accorded to AT&T's other customers and Dataway does not seek to enforce "side agreements" which vary from published tariffs. Rather, Dataway wants to enforce the contracted rate pursuant to the tariff. Moreover, rates have meaning only when one knows the services to which they are attached. Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services and vice versa. The Communications Act recognizes this in the §§ 203(a) and (c). American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 215.

In the case at hand, there was not authorization by Dataway to open the disputed Legacy T account or to charge a fee related to the second line of service which Dataway neither had knowledge of or requested. Similar to <u>Brown</u>, where the court held that a claim is not precluded by the filed-rate doctrine if (1) the Plaintiff alleges that there is no authorization in the tariff to charge a certain fee, and (2) that the fee therefore violated the tariff. <u>Brown v. MCI Worldcom Network Servs.</u>, Inc., 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002). Compensating the plaintiff for the tortious conduct pleaded does not contravene the filed rate doctrine. <u>Lovejoy</u>, at 101. Dataway is not seeking rate preferences not accorded to AT&T's other customers, or to enforce "side agreements" which vary from published tariffs. Rather, Dataway only seeks enforcement of the rate it contracted for pursuant to the tariff. Hence, Dataway merely seeks to enforce the tariff. Consequently, Dataway's claims are not barred by the File Rate Doctrine.

B. All Elements of Dataway's Five Counterclaims are Supported by Undisputed Evidence on Record

Counterplaintiff's claims are supported by sufficient undisputed facts and are admitted by AT&T. As discussed above, Dataway merely filed a motion to dismiss after being served with Dataway's Answer and its Counterclaims. As previously mentioned, a motion to dismiss cannot be regarded as a responsive pleading though. Therefore, all facts and allegations asserted in Dataway's Answer and Counterclaims are admitted and are in evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). These facts sufficiently support Dataway's five causes of action against AT&T. For this reason, summary judgment in favor of the moving party AT&T should be denied. Instead, summary judgment in favor of Dataway is proper and should be granted.

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Each element of Dataway's First Cause of Action are supported by undisputed facts which only permits a reasonable jury to decide in Dataway's favor.

To prove a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must show 1) a contract; 2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; 3) defendant's breach; and 4) resulting damage to the Plaintiff. Owest Communs. Corp. v. Herakles, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22154, 18 (D. Cal. 2008).

Two written instruments lie at the heart: (1) the telecommunication service agreement between Dataway and SBC/AT&T and (2) the Anti-Slamming Agreement. Both constitute legally binding, enforceable and reasonable contracts between SBC's successor AT&T and Dataway. California law requires four elements to form a valid contract: (1) parties capable of contracting; (2) their mutual consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) sufficient consideration. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1550, 1565. These four elements are obviously met by the service contract and the Anti-Slamming agreement. The aforementioned two agreements are valid and enforceable contracts and contemplate an implied warranty to impose security means restricting access by third parties. Furthermore, Dataway duly performed all its contractual obligations. It made and still makes payments covering AT&T's charges for Dataway's authorized account usage. However, AT&T's conduct was arbitrary and unreasonable. Adm. CC. ¶¶ 19. On July 24, 2006, hackers illegally accessed the voice mail system Dataway maintained with AT&T. The hacker used AT&T's Legacy T network to conduct calls to the Philippines. Deposition Francisco Molieri p. 81.2-7. AT&T billed these calls at a rate of \$5.78 per minute. According to the contractual long distance plan rate, calls to the Philippines cost \$ 0.30 cents per minute. However, the arbitrary \$5.67 rate used to calculate the unauthorized calls is 1,920% higher than Defendant's contracted rate. Hence, AT&T (1) switched to a non-contractual rate, and (2) created an account for Dataway without Dataway's authorization. This switch and unauthorized account creation only occurred because the routing number of the calls pointed to Dataway. AT&T allowed a switching of services without applying sufficient verification procedures and failed to avoid an unwanted switching as required under AT&T's contractual obligation.

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Furthermore, on November 3, 2006 and April 3, 2008 (after commencement of the present
litigation) AT&T sent a Disconnect Notice to Dataway, threatening Dataway to disconnect its
authorized account despite Dataway's continued payments throughout. This non-performance
constitutes a contractual breach of AT&T's duties and warranties warranty obligations.

The Civil Code states that "[f]or the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom." Cal. Civ. Code § 3300. Therefore, despite AT&T's claims, Cal. Civ. Code § 3300 does not limit the types of available damages. Instead § 3300 limits an award of contract damages to those damages that arise naturally from a breach of the contract or those that would reasonably be foreseen by the parties as arising from a breach of the contract. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 125 (App. Ct. 1977). The damages sought by Dataway for AT&T's breach of contract compromise of damages that naturally arise from and would be reasonably foreseen by the parties as arising from a breach of the contract. Business interruption and expenditure of time naturally arise from AT&T's breach of its contract. Damages for breach of contract are intended to give the injured party the benefit of his or her bargain. Martin v. U-Haul Co. of Fresno, 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 409 (Ct. App. 1988). The aim is to put the injured party in as good a position as he or she would have been if performance had been rendered as promised. Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Accountancy Corp., 226 Cal. App. 3d 442, 468 (Ct. App. 1990). Had AT&T not breached the contract, Dataway would not have had to expend time resolving the improper billing and would not have experienced business interruption. An award of damages to compensate Dataway for this business interruption and its expenditure of time is necessary to put Dataway in as good a position as it would have been in had AT&T not breached the contract. These damages amount to \$ 57,200.00 as calculated in Dataway's Response to AT&T's Special Interrogatories.

Judgment on Dataway's first counterclaim in favor of AT&T is not proper. Dataway has properly established by use of undisputed facts all of the elements of a claim for breach of

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contract including the amount of allowable damages.	Hence,	summary	judgment	Dataway'	S
favor is proper and should be granted.					

2. Each Element of a Breach of Oral Contract is Established by Undisputed Facts

AT&T's mischaracterization of Dataway's second counterclaim as "simply alleg[ing] 'waiver'" is patently false. See Mot. SJ. p.9 1.1. Dataway is correct in stating that "an allegation of 'waiver' does not constitute a claim for affirmative relief." Id. at 1.4. Dataway does not allege waiver. Rather, Dataway alleges breach of oral contract. A brief explanation of AT&T's cited case Kern Sunset Oil Co. demonstrates the difference between waiver and the breach of oral contract as alleged by Dataway. Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co., 214 Cal. 435 (1931). In Kern, the plaintiff landlord sued for breach of a lease. However, the landlord had accepted rent from the lessee after the breach occurred without objecting to the breach. Therefore, the court found that the landlord had waived his ability to bring a claim for breach of the lease. Dataway is not attempting to bring an affirmative claim for waiver. Rather, Dataway is bringing a claim for breach of oral contract. The fact that the counterclaim describes AT&T agreeing to "waive its charges for the fraudulent calls" does not transform the properly alleged breach of oral contract claim into an affirmative claim of waiver as AT&T alleges. See Adm. CC. ¶ 21.

To prove the existence of an oral contract, a Plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of the contract; (3) that plaintiff performed all the terms and conditions required under the contract; (4) defendant's breach of the contract in some particular way; and (5) that plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. v. Bratton, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46351 (D. Iowa 2007)

After Dataway contacted AT&T's local managers on September 20, 2006 (see DW 001), and requested the removal of the disputed charges from its accounts, an oral agreement was reached in which AT&T agrees to waive its charges for the fraudulent calls once Dataway formally disputed them. See Bate-Stamps DW 003, 006, AT&T 82, Deposition of Francisco Molieri p. 13 1.1-7. On November 10, 2006, Dataway performed its contractual duties.

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Consequently, Defendant submitted a written denial and sent a duly completed form to AT&T's
Fraud Resolution Group with copies to AT&T. See Bate-Stamps 003, AT&T 122-124, AT&T
5-6, AT&T 153. However, AT&T failed to perform its contractual obligations. Even though (1)
the threatened disconnection was suspended, (2) Dataway was once again reassured that AT&T
would drop all charges and (3) AT&T sent a November 2007 account statement stating that
Dataway's account was balanced. See Bate-Stamp AT&T141. It was not until January 2007
that Dataway was notified of AT&T's referral of the dispute to a collection attorney for
litigation proceeding. At that point, Dataway realized that AT&T did not intend to honor its oral
contract with Dataway.

Dataway has suffered damages in an amount of \$ 57,200.00 as a result of AT&T's breach. The damages sought by Dataway for AT&T's breach of contract both naturally arise from and are foreseeable by the parties as arising from a breach of the oral contract. Business interruption and expenditure of time naturally arise from AT&T's breach of its contract. Had AT&T not breached the contract, Dataway would not have had to expend time resolving the improper billing and would not have experienced business interruption. An award of damages to compensate Dataway for this business interruption and its expenditure of time is necessary to put Dataway in as good a position as it would have been had AT&T not breached the contract. See supra, p. 13 1. 5-26.

Judgment on Dataway's Second Counterclaim in favor of AT&T is not proper. Dataway has properly established by use of undisputed facts all of the elements of a claim for breach of oral contract including the amount of allowable damages. Hence, summary judgment Dataway's favor is proper and should be granted.

3. Each Element of Fraudulent Inducement to Contract is Proven

Fraudulent inducement to contract is a recognized cause of action. In essence, it is a claim of promissory fraud. Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 857 (Cal. 1997). Its elements are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter'); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage." Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th

1	ed. 1988) Torts, § 676, p. 778; Civ. Code, § 1709. "An action for promissory fraud may lie
2	where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to enter into a contract." <u>Lazar v. Superior</u>
3	Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (Cal. 1996). In January 2003 AT&T affirmatively misrepresented to
4	Dataway that pursuant to the express terms of the parties' Carrier Slamming Protection
5	agreement, AT&T would be the exclusive long-distance telecommunication carrier and a
6	switching to other services would be impermissible; Dataway would be only responsible for
7	charges for which it had contracted. See Letter of Agency and Carrier Slamming Protection
8	Agreement. SBC/AT&T included this protection in accordance with 47 U.S.C § 258(a), its
9	implementing F.C.C. Regulations and the Public Utilities Code section 2889.5, preventing
10	telecommunication carriers from making unauthorized changes to subscribers' telephone
11	service. In November 2005, AT&T and SBC merged. AT&T assured former SBC customers
12	that their contractual relations will be continued without any changes and under the same
13	conditions. AT&T knew or should have known that its representations were false because other
14	incidents have shown that such a slamming device was not an appropriate means, in particular
15	with regard to the imminent acquisition of SBC by AT&T. See Bate-Stamps 11-23. The narrow
16	wording of the Anti-Slamming Agreement would be useless if not applied to AT&T's
17	sprawling corporate structure. As such, SBC/AT&T knew and did not intend to protect
18	Dataway from switching between different services as required by 47 U.S.C. § 258(a).
19	Nevertheless, AT&T assumed all of SBC's liabilities when it acquired SBC. Moreover, it knew
20	that a switching was possible because the pattern of illegal usage had occurred frequently prior
21	to the disputed incident. See Bate-Stamps 11-23. The technical team based in New Jersey stated
22	in phone conferences with Dataway that it was familiar with the type of phone hacking
23	Dataway had experienced and that such incidents were epidemic. Deposition of Francisco
24	Molieri p. 58 l. 25 – p. 59. 1 2, Deposition of Simon Lewis p.45 l.13-25. Despite this
25	knowledge, SBC/AT&T made the aforementioned representations and reassured Dataway that
26	its contracts will be continued by AT&T after it acquired SBC. This was obviously done with
27	the intent to induce Dataway to remain a customer of SBC/AT&T. Justifiable reliance is an
28	essential element of the claim. Such reliance exists when, absent the misrepresentation, the

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allegedly defrauded party would not have entered into the bargain. "False representations made recklessly and without regard for their truth in order to induce action by another are the equivalent of misrepresentations knowingly and intentionally uttered." Engalla, at 857. Dataway relied on Counterdefendant's representations that Dataway would only be charged for the contracted rate, and for only authorized services. Dataway also relied on AT&T's representation that AT&T faithfully assumes SBC's business and obligations. Due to a lack of prior negative incidents it had no reason to doubt AT&T's representations and was justified in relying on them. Based on SBC/AT&T's representations regarding its telecommunication services and its Anti-Slamming protection, Dataway entered into the telecommunication service contract. Dataway believed AT&T would provide the protection sought for Dataway's business telecommunication.

An award of damages to compensate Dataway for this business interruption and its expenditure of time is necessary to put Dataway in as good a position it would have been in had AT&T not breached the contract. These damages are in evidence as shown supra.

Judgment on Dataway's Third Counterclaim in favor of AT&T is not proper. Dataway has properly established by use of undisputed facts all of the elements of a claim for Fraudulent Inducement to Contract including the amount of allowable damages. Hence, summary judgment Dataway's favor is proper and should be granted.

4. Each Element of Slamming is Established by Undisputed Facts

The Telecommunication Act makes it unlawful for telecommunication carriers to "submit or Execute a change in a subscriber's selection of a provider of telephone exchange service or telephone toll service except in accordance with such verification procedures as the Commission shall prescribe." 47 U.S.C. § 258(a).

The facts asserted by AT&T to support its allegation that all changes were authorized are not in evidence and are not sufficient to eliminate Plaintiff's Fourth Counterclaim. As discussed above, Dataway asserted in its Counterclaim that hackers illegally accessed the voice mail system Dataway maintained with AT&T using AT&T's Legacy T Network. See supra. The assertion that it was Dataway's obligation to prevent hacking is unsupported by the

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evidence. Dataway had security means in place (see supra). Further, AT&T, not Dataway was in the position to prevent the hacking and resulting phone calls.

In his deposition, Simon Lewis states that Dataway has the strongest physical security means in place. The company buildings are secured by biometric fingerprint readers on the front doors (See Deposition of Simon Lewis, p. 351.24-25), Medeco locks (Id., p. 361.1-5), and card readers (Id., p. 36, 1.6). Dataway's voicemail system was secured by a password that was frequently changed (See Deposition of Francisco Molieri, p.12 1.15 to p.15 l. 22). These security means could not have prevented the unauthorized access by third parties because the hackers accessed the voicemail system (see Bate-Stamp AT&T 167) from a remote location outside Dataway's premises. In fact, the fraudulent calls originated from Kansas (Id., p.18 1.15-18) as identified by the caller ID. Deposition of Simon Lewis, p. 11, 1.9-13. This means, only a telecommunication specialist could have avoided an intrusion of the telephone circuit/wire itself. This is also supported by the fact that AT&T informed AT&T of the monitored hacking (See Declaration of Francisco Molieri, p. 8) and that AT&T can easily recognize these calls. See Declaration Simon Lewis, p. 45 l. 18-20.

Moreover, the Telecommunications Act makes it unlawful for telecommunications carriers to "...submit or execute a change in a subscriber's selection of a provider of telephone exchange service or telephone toll service except in accordance with such verification procedures as the Commission shall prescribe." 47 U.S.C. § 258(a). In its rules implementing section 258 and conforming its pre-existing anti-slamming regulations to the new statute the Commission established various procedures that carriers must use to verify the subscriber's authorization to submit the preferred carrier change order. These procedures, which vary depending on how the carrier chooses to market its services, include obtaining both "(i) Authorization from the subscriber, and (ii) Verification of that authorization in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this section." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1120(a)(1). "[A]ppropriate verification data..." can be the subscriber's date of birth or his social security number. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1120(a)(1), (c)(1), (c)(3)). The court in In Re Matter of Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection held that "...in the course of verifying the subscriber's intention to

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change his or her long distance service, a submitting carrier's independent, third party verifier i
required to elicit confirmation that the person contacted is authorized to make the change.
Additionally, the Public Utilities Code Section 2889.5 also contains certain mandatory
disclosure requirements for a carrier to follow when making any change in the provider of
telephone service. Included among them is to "thoroughly inform the subscriber of the nature
and extent of the service being offered" (Pub. Util. Code, section 2889.5 (a)(1)), verifying
whether "the subscriber intends to make any change in his or her telephone service provider,
and explain any charges associated with that change." Pub. Util. Code, section 2889.5(a)(2) In
re Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection et al., 23 F.C.C.R. 493.

AT&T merely uses an automated computer to identify the caller's authority. This computer cannot distinguish if it is communicating properly with an authorized human or improperly with another machine or computer. These facts establish, that AT&T did not comply with any of the imposed requirements. Therefore, AT employed procedures that clearly violated the Telecommunication Act.

Due to this illegal conduct, Dataway has been, and will continue to be injured. An award of damages to compensate Dataway for this business interruption and its expenditure of time is necessary to put Dataway in as good a position it would have been in had AT&T not breached the contract. These damages are in evidence as shown supra.

Judgment on Dataway's Fourth Counterclaim in favor of AT&T is not proper. Dataway has properly established by use of undisputed facts all of the elements of a claim for Violation of the Telecommunication Act including the amount of allowable damages. Hence, summary judgment Dataway's favor is proper and should be granted.

5. Each Element of Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations is Proven

In order to prevail on a claim for tortious interference with contract, plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a valid contract with a third party; (2) defendants' knowledge of that contract; (3) defendants' intentional acts designed to disrupt or induce a breach of the contractual relationship, (4) actual disruption or breach of the contractual relationship, and (5) resulting damage proximately caused by the acts of the defendant. Bank of N.Y. v. Fremont

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General Corp., F.3d, 2008 WL 269458 (9th Cir. 2008); Givenepower Corp. v. Pace Compumetrics, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59371 (D. Cal. 2007), 17. Claims for tortious interference with contract do not require pleading that defendants' conduct was independently wrongful because "intentionally interfering with a contract is a wrong in and of itself." Id. at 1158.

Dataway maintained an economic relationship with SBC/AT&T by using SBC/AT&T as its only business telecommunication carrier. Plaintiff alleges that the hacker knew and purposefully chose to access a voicemail system set up with AT&T. AT&T had superior authority and control over the Dataway's account, yet recklessly did not provide sufficient security to impede or prevent hackers from accessing Dataway's voice mail system. The only available security Dataway could employ itself was to protect its voicemail system using a password which it periodically changed. Deposition of Francisco Molieri p.12 1.15 to p.15 1.22

AT&T's intentional failure to properly secure Dataway's SBC/AT&T account led to abnormal and excessive charges that brought about the current dispute between Dataway and AT&T.

Dataway has been, and will continue to be irreparably injured by the hacker's reckless impairment of its contractual relationship, specifically AT&T's failure to prevent fraudulent use of the Legacy S services for which Dataway and SBC originally contracted.

Moreover, AT&T's creation of a Legacy T account and its billing for Legacy T network services were intentional interferences with the existing relationship Dataway had with SBC/AT&T, its Legacy S account. AT&T accurately states that the tort of intentional interference may be asserted only against "outsiders" where "outsiders" merely means parties that have no legitimate social or economic interest in the contractual relationship. Kasparian v. County of L.A., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 100 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1995). Here, the original contracting parties were Dataway and SBC with whom Dataway maintained a Legacy S account. The interference complained of, was the creation of an AT&T long distance Legacy T account. While AT&T, due to its merger with SBC, is technically a party the Court should treat AT&T as an "outsider." AT&T still distinguishes between Legacy S (under the SBC contracts)

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Matlock Law Group, PC. and Legacy T (under the AT&T contracts). AT&T had no legitimate interest in the Legacy S contract because it never negotiated the Legacy S service rates and conditions and in fact desired to adapt Dataway's account to AT&T standards.

Public policy considerations dictate that the Court should recognize AT&T's tortuous interference with the contract originally negotiated between Dataway and SBC. AT&T is an international corporation of significant power, one of only 30 companies to be deemed important to be listed on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Such a corporation is capable of exerting significant pressure on its customers, particularly small business customers that depend on the services provided by AT&T for the existence of their business. While losing a customer is a detriment to AT&T's business, AT&T is clearly in a position of strength when dealing with its small business customers.

AT&T has engaged in tortuous behavior that caused detriment to Dataway. AT&T's behavior directly interfered with the contract for services negotiated and entered into between Dataway and SBC. Had AT&T not recklessly failed to safeguard its system, there would have been no interference with the Dataway/SBC contract. Failure by the Court to hold AT&T liable for this behavior would allow AT&T, the proverbial Goliath, to tortuously interfere with Dataway, the proverbial David, and face no consequence.

The remaining elements of this cause of action are supported by undisputed facts as well. See Dataway's Counterclaim, p. 15 l.5-p. 16 l. 16 and p. 20 l. 9-25; Bate-Stamp AT&T5 and AT&T6, In January 2003, Dataway and SBC/AT&T entered into a service contract. Ms. Carswell's e-mails, the bills and the deposition show that AT&T knew of this business relationship due to AT&T's regular business activities it should have known of the contract between Dataway and the SBC/AT&T. Nevertheless, AT&T created an account without Dataway's knowledge or authorization improperly on the basis that an unknown third person or persons illegally accessed the voice mail system Dataway maintained with AT&T and used AT&T's Legacy T network to conduct calls to the Philippines. See Deposition of Francisco Molieri, p. 8. By reason of the resulting charges AT&T sent a bill to Dataway knowing it was exceeding contracted rate ultimately encouraging a dispute over Dataway's original service

contract. See Bates-Stamps AT&T2. On November 3, 2006 and April 3, 2008 (after commencement of the present litigation), AT&T sent a disconnect notice threatening the termination of the service that Dataway had contracted for its business telecommunication. Dataway, worried about an interruption of its services and searching for alternative carriers contacted AT&T's local managers trying to resolve the problem.

Due to both interferences by AT&T, Dataway has been, and will continue to be injured. An award of damages to compensate Dataway for this business interruption and its expenditure of time is necessary to put Dataway in as good a position it would have been in had AT&T not breached the contract. These damages are in evidence as shown supra.

Judgment on Dataway's Fifth Counterclaim in favor of AT&T is not proper. Dataway has properly established by use of undisputed facts all of the elements of a claim for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations including the amount of allowable damages. Hence, summary judgment Dataway's favor is proper and should be granted.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Dataway respectfully requests that this Court enter summary judgment in Dataway's favor on all counts of its Countercomplaint and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on AT&T's Complaint for Damages.

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Dated: July 15, 2008

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